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On its face, Schrems II is a sequel. Decided on July 16, 2020, the Court of Justice of
the EU (CJEU) found that the EU-US data protection agreement (“Privacy Shield”)
that had served as one of the bases for Facebook’s transfer of personal data to the
US was invalid. Because Privacy Shield could not guarantee an adequate level of
protection for EU personal data in the event of access by US intelligence agencies,
the CJEU found that it was in violation of the right to data protection. This judgment
was handed down five years after Schrems I, where the CJEU had ruled that Privacy
Shield’s predecessor agreement was invalid, in litigation involving the same parties,
the same, Irish, Data Protection Authority (DPA), and the same US intelligence
programs. 
But for all the similarities, it is critical to appreciate that the judgment in Schrems
II speaks to a radically changed political world. Since 2015, when Schrems I was
decided, a lot has happed. First, as has been extensively documented in the press
and official reports, Russia, Cambridge Analytica, and other bad actors have
exploited the privacy vulnerabilities of US-based Facebook to interfere with elections
and democratic societies. Second, in November 2016, Trump was elected US
President and since then he and his administration have undermined fundamental
principles of US liberal democracy. Third, in June 2016, the UK voted to leave
the EU, and on January 31, 2020, it did, taking with it its powerful security and
intelligence apparatus (subject to a transitional period that expires on December 31,
2020). Fourth, all the while, EU Member States have enacted expansive surveillance
laws, some in response to terrorist attacks like the Paris one in November 2015,
others as part of a larger pattern of democratic backsliding.
The rest of this post unpacks the implications of Schrems II for this new, unstable,
and in many instances, illiberal political landscape. A number of excellent posts
on this blog (here, here and here) have already examined the impact of Schrems
II on the corporate actors that transfer EU data globally. My focus here is on
how Schrems II and the CJEU’s evolving jurisprudence on the right to privacy can be
read as targeting the political developments of recent years.
Interference with democracy through Facebook (and
other global communications actors) 
First, interference with democracy through Facebook: One of the important lessons
of the past five years has been that privacy breaches, wherever they occur, make
democracies vulnerable, wherever they are. The first part of Schrems II details how,
under EU law, EU privacy officials should address this problem. There the CJEU
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discusses the EU’s interlocking system of standard contractual clauses (SCCs) and
third-country adequacy decisions for protecting the privacy of EU personal data
when it is transferred abroad by corporate actors. A SCC is what Facebook relied
on for making data transfers to the US but the adequacy decision (based on Privacy
Shield) was also necessary, to guarantee respect for privacy if Facebook data ended
up in the hands of the US government. 
What is striking is the CJEU’s emphasis on the duties and powers of DPAs to
enforce EU privacy standards when data is sent abroad. This has always been a
secondary area of DPA activity, in my view because of the discrepancies between
DPA resources and the corporate actors and the foreign jurisdictions that they are
supposed to be monitoring. How exactly is the relatively small Irish DPA supposed
to monitor the third-country transfers of the disproportionate number of digital
multinationals that have established their EU internal market presence via Ireland?
As a result, historically, most of the action on third-country transfers has been at the
EU level, in the form of European Commission third-country adequacy decisions,
standard contractual clauses, and binding corporate rules. 
In Schrems II, however, the CJEU came down in favor of more DPA enforcement in
the context of third-country transfers. In its detailed description of the enforcement
system, the DPAs are the essential backstop for contractually-based transfers to
third countries: if they find that the terms of standard contractual clauses are not
being complied with in third countries, they must either suspend or prohibit the
transfer (paras. 145-148). Even in the case of third-country transfers based on
adequacy decisions, DPAs play an essential role: as the Irish DPA did in Schrems
II with respect to the Privacy Shield decision, DPAs are obliged to refer any doubts
as to whether a country has “adequate” privacy to their national courts, which in
turn are to refer the issue to the CJEU (paras. 119, 120). Ultimately, the upshot of
more DPA enforcement will be the need for more data localization by commercial
actors—something that the CJEU has already indicated for law enforcement actors
in its Tele2 judgment.
The Trump administration
Second, the Trump administration: The first part of the Schrems II judgment and
its emphasis on enforcement applies not just to data transfers to the US but to
all foreign jurisdictions. As many Schrems II commentators have correctly noted,
ensuring adequacy is far more difficult, and unlikely, in the case of transfers to
authoritarian regimes like China. But the second part of Schrems II concerns
specifically the (in)adequacy of US privacy guarantees for EU personal data in
intelligence surveillance. In assessing (in)adequacy, the CJEU’s analysis was strictly
limited to the US law on the books. However, it certainly didn’t help that the Trump
administration has relentlessly politicized and circumvented the executive branch,
including the intelligence and foreign policy establishment, which in the Privacy
Shield bore significant responsibility for protecting EU privacy. 
As is well known, there is a legal vacuum in US constitutional law for the privacy of
non-US persons. (In statutory law, a “US person” is defined as either a citizen or
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a permanent resident, and a “non-US person” as everyone else; the constitutional
law case on point speaks of foreign citizens and residents “with no voluntary
attachment” to the US.) Since 9/11 , this constitutional vacuum has been used first
by the President (under Article II) and then by Congress (with the enactment of
Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act) to expand the surveillance powers of the
intelligence community and, to a lesser extent, law enforcement. In the long fall out
from the Snowden revelations, US diplomacy has been geared at assuring the EU
that the surveillance of non-US persons in the institutional practice of the executive
branch is far less expansive and much more privacy protective than it might seem
from the letter of the law. This was the gist of President Obama’s PPD-28 and the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Department of Justice, and State
Department annexes to the Privacy Shield.
Even pre-Trump, the executive branch assurances given in PPD-28 and the Privacy
Shield would likely not have convinced the CJEU. In Schrems II, the absence of
recourse to an independent court was the major flaw with the US system that was
singled out by the CJEU. Effective judicial redress has always been essential to the
CJEU’s data protection jurisprudence and the fact of the matter is that it doesn’t
exist in intelligence surveillance, especially for non-US persons. However, Trump’s
election and the breakdown of a variety of institutional norms, sealed Privacy
Shield’s fate. 
In the Privacy Shield, an ombudsman within the State Department was supposed
to serve as the executive branch’s institutional alternative to courts. To quote from
the State Department’s website: 
The Under Secretary [i.e. the Privacy Shield Ombusdman] reports
directly to the Secretary of State and is independent from the Intelligence
Community. To carry out the Ombudsperson duties, the Under Secretary
works closely with other United States Government officials, including
independent oversight bodies such as inspectors general, as appropriate, to
ensure that completed requests are processed and resolved in accordance
with applicable laws and policies [emphasis added].
But without any apparent legal or even significant political fallout,
Trump dismissed first the Inspector General for the Intelligence Community in April
2020 and then the Inspector General for the State Department in May 2020. Under
such conditions, where dismissal appears to be entirely at will, it is difficult to believe
the claim of independence. 
In short, the credibility of the internal, executive branch safeguards detailed in the
Privacy Shield has suffered during the Trump administration. The CJEU’s repeated
insistence in Schrems II on independent courts as the essential guarantors of privacy
can be seen, at least in part, as a response to this experience. 
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Brexit
Third, Brexit: Once the Brexit transitional period expires on December 31, 2020, the
UK will be, legally speaking, a third country. In Schrems II, the CJEU made it clear
that, as a third country, all aspects of the UK’s privacy regime, including national
security, will fall under the scope of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),
and will be subject to the requirement of adequacy (paras. 87-88). Moreover, the
CJEU said that the analysis of third-country adequacy proceeds entirely based on
the GDPR, read in light of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (para. 101)—not
the European Convention of Human Rights, which is believed by many to be less
demanding on the privacy issue. This is particularly significant for the UK since its
security and intelligence agencies conduct extensive bulk interception, collection,
and “equipment interference,” i.e. hacking. 
Beyond the UK’s own surveillance capacity, it is known to collaborate extensively
with foreign governments, including the US, as part of the Five Eyes Agreement. For
law enforcement purposes, now there is also the UK-US CLOUD Act Agreement for
police access to stored communications, as well as for real-time wiretaps of wire
and electronic communications; this agreement specifically contemplates US access
to the communications of third-country nationals handled by UK providers, e.g. EU
persons. As the prospect of a “hard” Brexit has become a reality, the UK government
has pivoted even closer to the US, with implications for more US-UK data sharing
and privacy rights—and for the adequacy of UK law from the perspective of EU
personal data. 
A good preview of what the Brexit future might look like is Elgizouli v. Secretary of
State for the Home Department. That case involved a UK MLAT transfer of criminal
evidence to the US, without the standard assurances from the US government
of (not) seeking the death penalty. The UK Supreme Court found that the UK
government’s transfer was unlawful because the government had failed to comply
with the UK Data Protection Act 2018, which poses strict limitations on third-country
transfers for law enforcement purposes. In the future however, with the many
anticipated changes that will be made to statutory law, the UK courts will not be
able to exercise the same judicial review powers. Schrems II serves as a useful
affirmation and reminder that EU law, EU DPAs, and the CJEU will step in when EU
personal data is at stake. 
Expansive surveillance laws in the EU Member
States
Fourth and last, crisis-fueled, expansive surveillance legislation in many Member
States: For various reasons, European statutory law has typically not relied on the
categorical distinction between foreigners and citizens/permanent residents that
is so important for US privacy law. In a set of recently decided fundamental rights
cases (for the European Court of Human Rights, see the German Constitutional
Court’s discussion at para. 271), this is becoming a matter of constitutional law too
—foreigners without any physical connection to the territory of the surveilling nation
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nonetheless have rights if they are subject to the surveillance of that nation. What
is striking, however, are the surveillance powers that are emerging in some places
with respect to all persons, including resident nationals. A Swedish intelligence
law that was litigated, and found to be lawful by the European Court of Human
Rights, provides for intelligence interception, based on “tasking directives,” of all
“cable-based cross-border communications”—surveillance powers that do not
seem far off from the National Security Agency’s Section 702 programs, but without
the safeguards that exist there for US persons. In the CJEU, there is currently a
pending UK case that involves intelligence orders for bulk communications data—
something that is simply a more tailored version of the National Security Agency’s
original Section 215 program. There is also a pending French case, where among
the intelligence tools at issue is real-time algorithmic surveillance of the metadata
generated by domestic communications networks to identify security threats.
In the UK and French cases, the CJEU has been called upon to evaluate privacy
in intelligence surveillance internally, in the activities of Member State security and
intelligence services. Schrems II, which has been decided first, might possibly be
a first step in developing a CJEU jurisprudence on privacy in mass surveillance
programs. The UK and French cases raise the threshold issue of whether EU
fundamental rights law applies in the context of the activities of Member State
security agencies. This is tied to the Treaty on European Union’s exclusion from
EU competences of national security. If the CJEU does find that EU law applies, it
will have to address the question of what privacy standards govern in the context of
national security surveillance. On this, it is clear from Schrems II that independent
courts should have oversight and remedial powers but otherwise the judgment is
quite vague. The unstable geopolitics and the illiberal developments of the past
couple of years highlight the many competing considerations—combating election
interference based on the unlawful manipulation of personal data is one of the
important activities of national security agencies, yet at the same time expansive
surveillance laws threaten rights and, in the case of democratic-backsliding, can be
used to consolidate authoritarian rules. 
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